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Abstract—We propose a modeling framework for generating
security protocol specifications. The generated protocol
specifications rely on the use of a sequential and a semantical
component. The first component defines protocol properties such
as preconditions, effects, message sequences and it is developed
as a WSDL-S specification. The second component defines the
semantic aspects corresponding to the messages included in
the first component by the use of ontological constructions and
it is developed as an OWL-based specification. Our approach
was validated on 13 protocols from which we mention: the
ISO9798 protocol, the CCITTX.509 data transfer protocol and
the Kerberos symmetric key protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Security protocols are widely used today to provide secure
communication over insecure environments. By examining the
literature we come upon various security protocols designed
to provide solutions to specific problems [1]. With this large
amount of protocols to chose from, distributed heterogenous
systems must be prepared to handle multiple security proto-
cols.
Existing technologies, such as the Security Assertions
Markup Language [3] (i.e. SAML) or WS-Security [2] provide
a unifying solution for the authentication and authorization is-
sues through the use of predefined protocols. By implementing
these protocols, Web services authenticate users and provide
authorized access to resources. However, despite the fact that
existing solutions provide a way to implement security claims,
these approaches are rather static. This means that in case of
new security protocols, services must be reprogrammed.
In this paper we propose a more flexible solution to this
problem by developing a security protocol specification gen-
eration framework based on existing Web service technologies
such as WSDL-S [8] and OWL [10], aiming at the automatic
discovery and execution of security protocols.
A security protocol specification is a description of the
protocol messages exchanged by participants and of the mech-
anisms related to the construction and processing of messages.
By inspecting the literature we come upon various forms of
specifications [4], [5], each specification being specifically
designed for a task.
Based on this observation, in the process of developing a
new specification we first formulate a set of requirements.
Because the proposed specification includes a description of
the messages exchanged by participants, which is also one
of the goals of the well-known informal specification, we
consider the informal specification as the starting point of the
construction process. Based on the formulated requirements,
we identify two components: the message sequential specifi-
cation, or more briefly SEQ-S, and the semantic specification,
or more briefly SEM-S.
The first component is designed as a WSDL-S specifica-
tion which includes the sequence of messages that must be
executed. For each message component an annotation is pro-
vided in order to link the component with the corresponding
semantic information.
The second component is designed as an ontological spec-
ification by using OWL. An ontology is a “formal, explicit
specification of a shared conceptualization” [11], consisting of
concepts, properties (i.e. relations) and restrictions. Ontologies
are part of the semantic Web technology, which associates se-
mantic descriptions to Web services. Each message component
from the protocol is represented as a concept in a hierarchical
structure. In order to provide processing information, domain-
range properties are defined for each concept.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II
we provide a description of the proposed framework. In section
III we present some of our experimental results. In section IV
we relate our work to others. We end with a conclusion and
future work in section V.
II. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Requirements
The proposed framework must guarantee the construction of
a complete security protocol specification. The basic require-
ments that must be satisfied are extracted from the informal
specification. These include the explicit specification of proto-
col participants, message directions, cryptographic algorithm
classes and message component types.
In order for participants to implement and execute protocols
based on the generated specifications, the above-mentioned
requirements are not enough. We also need to include several
requirements for describing internal mechanisms such as con-
structing, processing and verifying messages. The resulting
additional requirements include, among others, specifying
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the cryptographic parameters and processing operations for
constructed and processed message components.
Based on these requirements we identified two specification
components: the message sequence specification, or SEQ-S,
and the semantic specification, or SEM-S.
B. SEQ-S structure
The message sequence specification has been developed
as a WSDL-S specification. The WSDL-S specification in-
herits the structure of WSDL. It provides, in addition to
WSDL, semantic annotation possibilities through the use of
the wssem:modelReference attribute. In SEQ-S, the WSDL-S
sections are maintained and used without any change.
For each protocol participant a WSDL-S specification is
constructed. Because of this, each WSDL-S specification will
contain only one portType section and one binding section.
The portType section provides an abstract group of opera-
tions. Each operation contains a reference to a message and
an attribute containing the communication direction of that
message (i.e. input or output).
In addition to providing semantics to each message, we
use the wssem:precondition and wssem:effect tags to specify
semantic information related to the preconditions needed to be
satisfied in order to execute the protocol and effects that are
activated if the protocol is executed.
C. SEM-S structure
Preconditions, effects and XML schema elements are anno-
tated in SEQ-S with references to concepts from the semantic
specification (SEM-S). SEM-S is constructed as an ontology
consisting of several smaller ontologies. In order to satisfy the
requirements formulated in the previous sections we identified
7 ontologies based on which the semantic specification is
constructed.
In the design of these ontologies we followed the principles
proposed in [11]. As in any design process, we used a
repetitive design and implementation in order to model the
requirements of as many protocols as possible. The resulting
ontologies are the starting point for constructing the semantic
specification of a security protocol. Figure 1 shows the core
ontology of SEM-S.
Fig. 1. Core ontology of SEM-S
In the process of constructing SEM-S, the proposed sub-
ontologies are extended with concepts and properties. The
concepts are specific to each protocol, however, the defined
properties are applied on all constructions. From these prop-
erties we mention: isOfType, isEncrypted, isStored, isVerified,
isExtracted, hasSymmetricAlgorithm or hasKey.
In the remaining of this sub-section we construct a formal
ontology model used in the definition process of the proposed
rules. The ontology model is defined as follows.
Definition 1: An ontology model (OM) is a triplet
〈CONC, PROP, INST 〉, where CONC is the set of
concepts defined for the ontology, PROP is the set of
properties and INST is the set of all instances. An element
from PROP is a pair 〈α, β〉, where α is a unique id and β
is a syntactic construction denoting the property name.
In order to handle elements from an OM, we define the
following mapping functions:
• domain : PROP → CONC to map the domain concept
corresponding to a given property;
• range : PROP → CONC to map the range concept
corresponding to a given property;
• prop : CONC → PROP ∗ to map the set of properties
for which the given concept is a domain;
• parent : CONC → CONC to map the parent of a
given concept;
• subcon : CONC → CONC∗ to map the set of concepts
for which the given concept is a parent concept;
• mincard : PROP → N to map the minimum cardinality
for a given property;
• maxcard : PROP → N to map the maximum cardinal-
ity for a given property.
The construction of SEM-S is based on a set of 13 rules
we identified using a repetitive design and implementation of
specifications. Because of space considerations in this section
we only present rules that are the most relevant
Processing rules. Rules from this category provide a set
of guiding lines to model terms and protocol operations as
concepts and properties such that processing of terms is made
possible.
For example, the next rule states that for every concept
from the KnownTerm sub-ontology there must be an isOfType
property defined.
Rule1. For every sub-concept of KnownTerm that is
not a sub-concept of a cryptographic concept there is an
isOfType property defined. Formally,
∀c ∈ subcon(KnownTerm) if
6 ∃p′ ∈ prop(parent(c)) :
name(p) = SymmEncrypted , then ∃p ∈ prop(c) :
name(p) = isOfType∧
mincard(p) = maxcard(p) = 1.
Cryptographic rules. The rules from this category require
that for each generated term (e.g. symmetric key, random
number) or cryptographic term (e.g. symmetric encryption,
hash, signature), generation or construction properties are
also specified.
Rule2. For every sub-concept of GeneratedTerm with
the RandomNumber property defined, there is a hasLength
property. Formally,
∀c ∈ subcon(GeneratedTerm) if ∃p ∈ prop(c) :
name(p) = RandomNumber then ∃p′ ∈ prop(c) :
name(p′) = hasLength∧
mincard(p′) = maxcard(p′) = 1.
Storage rules. In order to model storage modules from
which keys, certificates or tokens are extracted we use the
LoadingModule sub-ontology.
Rule3. For every sub-concept of LoadedTerm there is an
isLoaded property defined. Formally,
∀c ∈ subcon(LoadedTerm),∃p ∈ prop(c) :
name(p) = isLoaded∧
mincard(p) = maxcard(p) = 1.
D. Example construction
In order to provide an example usage of the previously
defined framework we provide a partial construction of the
sequential and semantic specification for the initiator role from
the “BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC”.
By examining the informal specification we conclude that
participant A is the initiator of the protocol. For this par-
ticipant, we must define two outgoing and two incoming
messages. The goal of the protocol is the exchange of the
session key K. The resulting partial SEQ-S specification is
given in figure 2.
...
<xsd:element name="Msg1Request">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="Participant A" type="xsd:string"
wssem:modelReference=".../SecProt.owl#Sent_A"/>
<xsd:element name="Random" type="xsd:base64Binary"
wssem:modelReference=".../SecProt.owl#Sent_Na/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="Msg2Response">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="EncTerm1" type="xsd:base64Binary"
wssem:modelReference=".../SecProt.owl#EncTerm1">
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
...
<wsdl:operation name="Msg1">
<wsdl:output message="tns:Msg1Request"/>
</wsdl:operation>
<wsdl:operation name="Msg2">
<wsdl:input message="tns:Msg2Response"/>
</wsdl:operation>
<wssem:effect name="SessionKeyExchange"
wssem:modelReference=".../SecProt.owl#SessionKey"/>
...
Fig. 2. SEQ-S example schema, precondition and effect
Fig. 3. CommunicationTerm sub-ontology
Fig. 4. Discovered terms modeled as concepts
The SEM-S construction process starts by examining the
SEQ-S specification from which the concepts that must
be added to the CommunicationTerm sub-ontology are ex-
tracted. The resulting CommunicationTerm and KnownTerm
sub-ontologies are given in figure 3 and figure 4 respectively,
where interrupted lines denote properties.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For our experiments, we developed over 38 WSDL-S and 38
OWL specifications corresponding to initiator and respondent
protocol roles. The WSDL-S specifications were constructed
using Eclipse’s web service package [6] while the OWL
specifications were constructed using the well-known ontology
editor, Prote´ge´ [14].
The goal of our experiments was to prove that the specifica-
tions contain sufficient information for participants to execute
the described protocols and at the end of the execution process
the protocol goals are achieved.
In order to execute the specifications, messages were en-
coded and transmitted according to the constructions provided
by the WS-Security standard [2]. In the experiments we con-
ducted, participants downloaded the specification files from a
public server and they were able to execute the protocols based
only on the received descriptions. The participants hardware
and software configurations: Intel Dual Core CPU at 1.8GHz,
1GByte of RAM, MS Windows XP.
TABLE I
PROTOCOL EXECUTION TIMINGS
Protocol S-PR. M-CON. M-PR. Total
participant (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
BAN Init. 14.58 11.81 3.68 30.08
BAN Resp. 14.03 2.86 1.62 18.52
ISO9798 Init. 13.07 35.784 23.30 72.16
ISO9798 Resp. 13.51 6.876 12.24 32.63
Kerb. Init. 1 22.63 0.83 0 23.47
Kerb. Init. 2 12.61 0.55 1.58 14.76
Kerb. Init. 3 2.23 3.34 0.94 6.52
Kerb. Resp. 1 19.28 0 0.41 19.69
Kerb. Resp. 2 10.81 3.379 1.67 15.87
Kerb. Resp. 3 5.25 11.41 3.59 20.26
Part of the experimental results are given in table I, where
the values correspond to milliseconds. The S-PR column
denotes the specification processing time, the M-CON column
denotes the message construction time (for output messages)
and the M-PR column denotes the message processing time
(for input messages). The table contains two two-party proto-
cols (“BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC”, or more simply
BAN, and ISO9798) and one three-party protocol (Kerberos).
The performance differences between the BAN and ISO9798
protocols are due to the fact that ISO9798 makes use of
public key cryptography, while BAN uses only symmetric
cryptography.
IV. RELATED WORK
In this section we describe approaches we found in the
literature that mostly relate to our proposal.
An approach that aims at the automatic implementation of
security protocols is given in [13]. This approach uses a formal
description as a specification which is executed by participants.
The proposed specification does not make use of Web service
technologies, because of which inter-operability of systems
executing the given specifications becomes a real issue. In
addition, because our approach uses the ontology model, it
benefits of several properties specific to ontologies, such as
semantic properties, extendability or reusability of ontologies
developed by others.
Another automated security protocol implementation ap-
proach is proposed in [7]. The specification in this case is
constructed as an XML document from which the code is
automatically generated. The resulting code is then compiled
and executed by participants. Because of this aspect, our
proposal is more dynamic in the sense that applications can
download and execute new protocols based on the developed
specifications automatically, without having to stop program
execution.
The authors from [12] propose a security ontology for
resource annotation. The proposed ontology defines concepts
for security and authorization, for cryptographic algorithms
and for credentials. This proposal was designed to be used
in the process of security protocol description and selection
based on several criteria. In contrast, our ontologies, have a
more detailed construction. For example, the ontology from
[12] defines a collection of cryptographic algorithms, however,
it does not define the algorithm mode, which is a more
implementation-specific information. In addition, we did not
only propose an ontology, but also a set of rules to construct
a specification.
There have been several other security ontologies proposed
[9], [15]. Because they do not relate to the specification of
security protocols, they can not replace our proposal, but only
complete it with additional concepts.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a framework for generating security protocol
specifications. Our proposal generates two components: a
message sequential and a semantic component. The first one
is implemented through the use of WSDL-S while the second
one through OWL.
In order to validate our proposal we constructed over 38
specifications for well-known protocols from the literature
(e.g. SSL, Kerberos) and tested them for automatic execution
on client and server programs.
As future work we intend to create a tool for the auto-
matic transformation of regular informal specifications into the
specifications proposed in this paper based on the described
framework.
REFERENCES
[1] Security Protocol Open Repository. Laboratoire Specification et Verifi-
cation, http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/, 2008.
[2] OASIS Web Services Security (WSS). Organization for the Advancement
of Structured Information Standards, http://saml.xml.org/, 2006.
[3] SAML V2.0 OASIS Standard Specification. Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards, http://saml.xml.org/, 2007.
[4] M. Abadi. Security protocols and specifications. Lecture Notes In
Computer Science, 1578:1–13, 1999.
[5] M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the
spi-calculus. In 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 36–47, 1997.
[6] Eclipse Web Tools Platform (WTP) Project. http://www.eclipse.org, 2008.
[7] I. Abdullah and D. Menasc. Protocol specification and automatic
implementation using XML and CBSE. IASTED conference on Com-
munications, Internet and Information Technology, November 2003.
[8] R. Akkiraju, J. Farrell, J. Miller, M. Nagarajan, M. Schmidt, A. Sheth,
and K. Verma. Web Service Semantics - WSDL-S. A joint UGA-IBM
Technical Note, 2005.
[9] C. Blanco, J. Lasheras, R. Valencia-Garcia, E. Fernandez-Medina, A. To-
val, and M. Piattini. A systematic review and comparison of security
ontologies. Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security, pages 813–820, 2008.
[10] W. W. W. Consortium. OWL Web Ontology Language Reference. W3C
Recommendation, 2004.
[11] T. Gruber. A translation approach to portable ontology specifications.
Knowledge Acquisition, 2(5):199–220, 1993.
[12] A. Kim, J. Luo, and M. Kang. Security ontology for annotating
resources. Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 3761:1483–1499, 2005.
[13] L. Mengual, N. Barcia, E. Jimenez, E. Menasalvas, J. Setien, and
J. Yaguez. Automatic implementation system of security protocols
based on formal description techniques. Proceedings of the Seventh
International Symposium on Computers and Communications, pages 355–
401, 2002.
[14] F. Natalya, M. Crubezy, R. W. Fergerson, H. Knublauch, W. Samson,
and J. Vendetti. Prote´ge´-2000: An open-source ontology-development and
knowledge-acquisition environment. AMIA Annual Symposium Proceed-
ings, 2003.
[15] D. G., L. Kagal, and T. Finin. Security in the semantic web using owl.
Information Security Technical Report, 1(10):51–58, 2005.
